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Mandatory arbitration provisions are the current standard in nursing home ad-
mission contracts,1 but the legal arguments surrounding their enforcement raise
questions concerning the validity of these standard provisions.2 Arbitration provi-
sions allow nursing homes to limit the transparency into their operations and keep
victims, and their families, quiet and out of the public eye.3 This, in turn, limits the
understanding of the shortcoming of current regulations and where new regulations
may help.4 The current Coronavirus Disease 2019 (èCOVID-19æ) pandemic has
brought to light some of these otherwise hidden regulatory issues surrounding nurs-
ing homes.5 As a result, several states have tried to continue to keep these hidden
regulatory issues secret by preventing COVID-19 related lawsuits.6
This Note argues that nursing home arbitration agreements should be disfa-
vored and discontinued through a number of mechanisms—as a condition for reim-
bursement under Medicaid and Medicare, as a judicial construction, and as a matter
of state licensing policy. This is relevant because this year follows a pivotal election
year, but also because of the current COVID-19 issues particularly effecting nursing
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homes around the United States.7 This Note advocates against the use of mandatory
arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts because their burdens outweigh
their benefits.8 Furthermore, this Note advocates against the use of mandatory ar-
bitration provisions in nursing home contracts because current legal theories on ad-
mission contracts refute the enforcement of such provisions.9
Part II of this Note discusses the history of mandatory arbitration provisions in
nursing home contracts, up to and including changes that occurred during the Trump
administration. Part III analyzes the current arguments in favor, and in opposition,
of mandatory arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts. Part IV analyzes
current legal theories that outline how these arbitration agreements are unenforcea-
ble and whether U.S. courts are applying these theories when interpreting nursing
home arbitration agreements.
II. HISTORY OFMANDATORYARBITRATION INNURSINGHOME
CONTRACTS
Arbitration is defined by the American Bar Association as èa private process
where disputing parties agree that one or several individuals can make a decision
about the dispute after receiving evidence and hearing arguments.æ10 Arbitration
may be preferential to traditional adjudication because the arbitrator is able to make
a decision and issue an award quicker and less formalistic than a court.11 Arbitration
provisions are the most commonly used provision in healthcare provider contracts
because they decrease the likelihood of medical malpractice litigation.12 While a
brief history of arbitration provisions will reveal their development and usage over
time, the most recent developments have come under the Trump administration and
in the current COVID-19 pandemic.
A. The Use of Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Nursing Home
Contracts Prior to the Trump Administration
The Federal Arbitration Act (èFAAæ),13 enacted in 1925,14 made arbitration
decisions enforceable in the United States.15 Prior to the FAA, arbitration was
7. Nina A. Kohn, Coronavirus isolated nursing home residents. Now it might keep them from voting,
THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/14/nurs-
ing-homes-voting-covid-discrimination/.
8. See generally, Gerald Taylor, Jr. & Kimberly Ward, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Admis-
sion Agreements: Are They Enforceable?, THE CONSUMER VOICE, https://theconsumervoice.org/up-
loads/files/issues/Gerald_Taylor.pdf (last visited May 10, 2021).
9. Id.
10. Arbitration, AMERICAN BARASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolu-
tion/resources/DisputeResolutionProcesses/arbitration/ (last visited May 10, 2021).
11. Id.
12. Michael Sacopulos & Jeffrey Segal, Limiting exposure to medical malpractice claims and defam-
atory cyber postings via patient contracts., 467(2) CLIN. ORTHOP. RELAT. RES. 427 (2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2628519/.
13. See generally, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 (2018).
14. Jon Shimabukuro & Jennifer Staman, Mandatory Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44960.pdf.
15. Daniel Kessler, Evaluating the medical malpractice system and options for reform. 25(2) J. ECON.
PERSPECT. 93 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3195420/.
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generally met with hostility within the judicial system.16 The FAA withdrew the
states’ powers to require a judicial forum, although there was split enforcement
among the courts until 1995.17 In 1995, the Supreme Court of the United States
determined in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson that the phrase
èinvolving commerceæ was intended to be interpreted broadly to include not only
èthe actual physical interstate shipment of goodsæ but also ècontracts relating to the
shipment of commerce.æ18 The Supreme Court made this interpretation to further
the primary purpose of the FAA, which was to help parties avoid litigation.19 Many
courts ruled that the FAA applied only to èonly those contracts where the parties
äcontemplated’ an interstate commerce connection.æ20 A 2001 decision by the
United States Supreme Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams applied a narrow
construction of the FAA’s exemption clause.21 This decision set a precedent for the
interpretation of other contracts that were seemingly unrelated to the Commerce
Clause based on the broad interpretation of section one of the FAA’s meaning of
èengaged in commerce.æ22 The Court interpreted èengaged in commerceæ to apply
to employment contracts except those that were exempted in the FAA.23 The Adams
decision showed just how broad the Court was willing to construe the FAA, but it
was not until 2012 that the Supreme Court explicitly applied the FAA to the nursing
home context.24
The 2012 Supreme Court decision in Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown,
directly challenged mandatory arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts. In
Marmet Health Care, the Court held that the FAA preempted any laws within the
state from limiting arbitration.25 The Court also held that there is no exception for
personal injury or wrongful death, which are the type of claims most often brought
in nursing home litigation.26 While this ruling did not allow states to prohibit man-
datory arbitration provisions, it did allow states to author unique decisions regarding
the enforcement of arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts between resi-
dents and their families.27
The most significant legal movement in terms of limiting mandatory arbitration
provisions in nursing home contracts did not take place until the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (èCMSæ) stepped into the enforcement picture.28 In
2016, prior to the change in presidential administrations, CMS proposed a ban on
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts for facilities that
16. Jon Shimabukuro & Jennifer Staman, Mandatory Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44960.pdf.
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 106 (2001).
22. Id. at 118.
23. Id. at 105.
24. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012).
25. Id. at 530.
26. Id. at 534.
27. Andi Alper, Seeking Justice for Grandma: Challenging Mandatory Arbitration in Nursing Home
Contracts, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 469 (2016).
28. See William Smith III & Robert Schenk, A Brief History of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Nursing Homes and the Current State of Law, THE CONSUMER VOICE (2018), https://theconsum-
ervoice.org/uploads/files/general/Arbitration_Clauses_in_Nursing_Home_Admission_Contracts.pdf.
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receive federal funding through Medicare and Medicaid.29 For the first time in over
two decades, the Federal Register was updated to include a final rule on èReform
of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities,æ which amended 42 CFR §
483.70(n) to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition for admis-
sion to a long-term care facility.30 This proposed rule was part of a three-phase
process to change the law surrounding arbitration agreements in nursing home con-
tracts.31 Initially, CMS planned to create several new requirements for pre-dispute
arbitration agreements: requiring an explanation of the agreement;32 having the res-
ident acknowledge their understanding of the agreement;33 removing language dis-
couraging the resident from speaking with outside officials;34 informing the resident
of their waiver of their right to judicial relief;35 expressly mandating that the arbi-
tration agreement could only be entered into voluntarily;36 and requiring a neutral
arbitrator during arbitration.37
In response to this proposed change, thirty-four senators, one representative,
and sixteen state attorney generals signed a letter pushing for an outright ban on
mandatory arbitration agreements.38 In response, a final rule was adopted by CMS
in September 2016.39 This rule required that long term care facilities èthat partici-
pate in Medicare or Medicaid ämust not enter into a pre dispute agreement for bind-
ing arbitration with any resident or resident’s representative nor require that a resi-
dent sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of admission to the LTC facil-
ity.’æ40 This new rule did not, however, prohibit post-dispute arbitration.41
In response to this new rule, the Chief Executive Officer and President of
American Health Care Association (èAHCAæ), the largest long-term care provider
in the U.S., denied the necessity of the rule and claimed that the new rule exceeded
CMS’s statutory authority.42 AHCA’s CEO, along with several other care facilities,
filed a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court in for the Northern
District of Mississippi, Oxford Division in October 2016 to prevent the enforcement
of the new rule.43 However, before the United States Court of Appeals could rule
on the lower court’s decision, the Obama administration was replaced by the Trump
administration in January 2017.44 As a result of a change in administrations, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services that appealed the injunction was re-
placed.45 The new secretary under the Trump Administration filed and was granted
a motion to dismiss the appeal.46
29. Id. at 8.
30. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revision of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities: Ar-
















46. Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 84 Fed. Reg. at 34718-01.
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B. The Reincarnation of Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Nurs-
ing Home Contracts from the Trump Administration
During the Trump administration, many changes made to nursing home arbi-
tration provisions by the Obama administration were reversed.47 In 2017, the
Trump administration permitted the use of mandatory arbitration provisions in nurs-
ing home contracts. 48 This decision was made in response to the Obama admin-
istration’s rule that prohibited facilities from entering contracts with those provi-
sions to receive Medicare and Medicaid benefits.49 The most recent rule of the
Trump administration, issued in July 2019,50 retained the 2017 proposed removal
of the ècore prohibition on pre-dispute arbitration agreements for long-term
healthcare facilities.æ51 Despite this, it did maintain an important provision from
the Obama administration rule in 2016.52 The new rule banned èfacilities from re-
quiring that residents sign arbitration agreements as a condition of admission to a
facility.æ53While facilities cannot require residents to sign an arbitration agreement
to be admitted to the facility, these provisions continue to be in many nursing homes
contracts so long as it doesn’t prevent residents from being admitted or continuing
to receive care.54
In addition to the reinstatement of arbitration provisions, the 2019 rule55 in-
cluded some limitations and transparency requirements for nursing homes, some of
which were included in the original 2017 proposal.56 First, the resident must un-
derstand and acknowledge their understanding of the agreement.57 Second, the
agreement must specify the selection of a neutral arbitrator and a venue that is con-
venient for both sides.58 Third, the resident must be given the right to rescind the
agreement within thirty days of signing.59 Lastly, the facility must maintain a copy
of the arbitration agreement for five years and have it available for CMS inspec-
tion.60
With the recent election of Joe Biden, it is likely that more changes will be
made to the healthcare system, but it is unclear how much focus will be placed on
the elderly or nursing homes. Such changes were not a focal point of either the
Republican or Democrat campaign platforms.61 Both parties have discussed
47. Id.








54. Mark Kantor et al., supra note 49.
55. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revision of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities: Ar-
bitration Agreements, 84 Fed. Reg. 34718-01 (July 18, 2019) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 34719.
58. Id. at 34718.
59. Id. at 34719.
60. Id.
61. See Sarah O’Brien, Trump vs Biden on Medicare: How each wants to modify the insurance pro-
gram, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/19/trump-vs-biden-on-medicare-how-
each-wants-to-change-it.html.
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provisions of Medicare they desire to change regarding drug prices or accessibil-
ity;62 so, at the very least, long-term care is a topic of discussion as the United
States’ population continues to increase in age.
C. COVID-19 and the Recent Election’s Role in Nursing Home Legislation
The current pandemic and the recent election have revealed regulatory con-
cerns with nursing homes that mandatory arbitration provisions have hidden. One
of these regulatory concerns recently brought to light is a concern with resource
allocation.63 In June 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, nearly one-third of nursing
homes in the United States reported either a staffing shortage, a personal protective
equipment shortage, or both.64
To address the staffing issue, the CMSwaived the 75-hour training requirement
for nursing aids and, in its place, implemented a free eight-hour online course.65
While this may help eliminate the staffing shortage, the lack of training and influx
of new employees likely resulted in an increase of neglect and abuse in nursing
facilities.66 In response, COVID-19 has not only increased the number of reported
complaints with nursing homes but has also resulted in a decrease in nursing home
liability.67 Over twenty-six states have instituted various barriers or even provided
immunity to nursing homes, shielding them from lawsuits that may arise as a result
of the nursing home’s approach to COVID-19.68 The concern is the length of time
that immunity shields will be in place and if these shields will continue to reduce
accountability for negligent care even after the pandemic ends.69
COVID-19 has taken a significant toll on nursing homes.70 As of January 24,
2021, there have been 611,805 confirmed COVID-19 cases among nursing home
residents around the United States and 121,772 deaths.71 Among staff members,
there have been 525,400 confirmed cases and 1,499 deaths.72 In addition, COVID-
19 has exacerbated some of the pre-COVID-19 issues with nursing home regula-
tion.73 There has been a strong correlation found between èfacilities with a history
62. Id.
63. Priya Chidambaram, Rising Cases in Long-term Care Facilities Are Cause for Concern, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Jul. 21, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/rising-cases-in-
long-term-care-facilities-are-cause-for-concern/.
64. Id.
65. Abigail Hauslohner &Maria Sacchetti, Nursing homes turn to quick fix training to meet pandemic




67. Tara Sklar & Nicolas P. Terry, States are making it harder to sue nursing homes over COVID-19:
Why immunity from lawsuits is a problem, THE CONVERSATION (June 9, 2020), https://theconversa-
tion.com/states-are-making-it-harder-to-sue-nursing-homes-over-covid-19-why-immunity-from-law-
suits-is-a-problem-139820.








73. See Brooks, supra note 69.
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of poor quality of care and infection control procedures and COVID-19 out-
breaks.æ74
The recent campaign for president, which focused significantly on COVID-19,
increased attention on the actions each presidential candidate would take for long-
term care. As previously mentioned, Donald Trump reinstated arbitration provi-
sions in nursing home contracts.75 And Joe Biden did not make any statements
during the campaign that revealed his view on arbitration provisions, although his
campaign did create a task force that proposed èexpand[ing] home and community
based care under Medicaid and support[ing] both family and paid caregivers.æ76
This may support alternatives for those who previously only had the option of plac-
ing their loved ones in a nursing home. Joe Biden’s actions as president over the
next four years will reveal whether he intends to fulfill his campaign promise.
The liability shields that have been established during COVID-19 hide the reg-
ulatory issues of nursing homes.77 Similarly, mandatory arbitration agreements
keep the regulatory issues with nursing homes hidden from the general public.78
While the states are taking actions to prohibit civil litigation against nursing homes,
courts have routinely held that the FAA supersedes any state prohibition on arbitra-
tion for a particular claim.79 The future prevention of these state actions by the
federal government make the recent election even more important for the future of
long-term care litigation against nursing homes as a result of COVID-19 care.
III. THEADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OFMANDATORY
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS INNURSINGHOME CONTRACTS
Nursing home mandatory arbitration provisions have advantages and disad-
vantages compared to traditional court-based dispute resolution. The use of arbi-
tration as the main forum of dispute resolution depends on the interests of the nurs-
ing home residents and the nursing homes, as shown through an analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages of mandatory arbitration provisions in nursing home
contracts.
A. The Advantages of Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Nursing
Home Contracts
Arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts can offer some specific ad-
vantages over traditional adjudication. These advantages are from the perspective
of the nursing home resident and their family, rather than from the nursing home’s
74. Id.
75. See id. at 49.
76. Howard Gleckman, Joe Biden Is Slowly Acknowledging The Nation’s Need To Reform Long-Term
Care, FORBES (July 17, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2020/07/17/joe-biden-is-
slowly-acknowledging-the-nations-need-to-reform-long-term-care/?sh=2707989e4d18#7bf024b34d18.
77. See Brooks et al., supra note 69.
78. See S. Rep. No. 110-518, supra note 4, at 3 (2008) (èBy preserving the residents’ option of pur-
suing claims in court for negligent or abusive care, not only will the public be able to make more in-
formed choices of nursing homes, but poorly-performing facilities will have a greater incentive to pre-
vent injuries and death.æ).
79. See Mandatory Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act, https://www.everycrsreport.com/re-
ports/R44960.html#_Toc493837805 (èIn these cases, the Court has routinely held that the FAA super-
sedes state requirements that restrain the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements.æ).
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perspective, but many are applicable to both parties. Overall, arbitration is faster,80
less expensive,81 less emotional,82 and more flexible than pursing litigation.83
The speed of arbitration usually contributes to a lower cost as compared to lit-
igation.84 Arbitration typically results in a decision more quickly than litigation,
which results in a decrease in attorney fees for both the resident and the nursing
home.85 In addition to a decrease in fees, arbitration increases the likelihood of a
payout to the plaintiff rather than a finding of no fault on the part of the defendant
in a jury trial.86 Contributing to the payout is the use of a knowledgeable arbitrator
rather than a jury that may not comprehend the complex issues.87 This results in a
more knowledgeable trier of fact, ideally resulting in a more fair outcome based on
the facts presented.88 Arbitration also typically does not have as much discovery as
compared to litigation.89 Written discovery requests and many witness depositions
are not necessary in arbitration,90 again contributing to an increase in speed and a
decrease in cost as compared to litigation.91
Arbitration also has decreased emotions92 and increased flexibility compared
to trials.93 Trials are often more hostile whereas arbitration tends to decrease the
hostility by encouraging the parties to work together to reach an agreement94 and
80. See Sacopulos & Segal, supra note 13, (èArbitration provides a faster, less emotional, and more
predictable alternative to the traditional jury trial.æ).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Clifton Brinson, Tips for Maximizing the Benefits of Arbitration, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 27,
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercial-business/prac-
tice/2017/tips-for-maximizing-the-benefits-of-arbitration/ (èFlexibility. An arbitrator can generally or-
der whatever relief he or she thinks is right, regardless of whether such relief would be available in a
court of law.æ).
84. Sacopulos & Segal, supra note 13.
85. Michelle Andrews, Signing a Mandatory Arbitration Agreement with a Nursing Home Can Be
Troublesome, THEWASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-sci-
ence/signing-a-mandatory-arbitration-agreement-with-a-nursing-home-can-be-trouble-
some/2012/09/16/ccf851ba-6a2c-11e1-acc6-32fefc7ccd67_story.html.
86. See David Sohn & B. Sonny Bal, Medical Malpractice Reform: The Role of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 470(5) CLINICAL ORTHOP. RELAT. RES. 1370 (May 2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3314770/ (èNonetheless, the basic principles that early
disclosure and apology reduce both the number of claims and ultimate payouts have been validated else-
where.æ).
87. See id. (è[Arbitration] is popular therefore among parties who fear the capricious nature of jury
verdicts and is seen as a means of risk management.æ).
88. Id.
89. See David Evans & India Johnson, The top 10 ways to make arbitration faster and more cost
effective, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_reposi-
tory/The%20Top%20Ten%20Ways%20to%20Make%20Arbitra-
tion%20Faster%20and%20More%20Cost%20Effective.pdf (è[A]rbitration should not be burdened with
full blown litigation discovery.æ).
90. Id.
91. See Sacopulos & Segal, supra note 13.
92. See Barbara Repa, Arbitration Pros and Cons, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclope-
dia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (èBecause the parties in arbitration are usually encouraged to par-
ticipate fully and sometimes even to help structure the resolution, they are often more likely to work
together peaceably rather than escalate their angst and hostility toward one another, as is often the case
in litigation.æ).
93. See Brinson, supra note 84 (èFlexibility. An arbitrator can generally order whatever relief he or
she thinks is right, regardless of whether such relief would be available in a court of law.æ).
94. Repa, supra note 93.
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facilitates more participation from both parties.95 Arbitrators have the flexibility to
grant relief that may or may not be available at trial.96 Arbitration is also flexible
for both parties in scheduling the actual arbitration.97 Whereas litigation is often
scheduled months or years after the initial filing date due to busy court dockets,98
formal discovery,99 and the court and judge’s availability,100 arbitration scheduling
will typically take into account the availability of the parties in the near future after
a shorter, more simple discovery period has passed.101
Because the arbitrator determines both the facts and the applicable laws, and
has specialized knowledge of the subject matter that is being arbitrated, the arbitra-
tor may more readily admit or exclude evidence.102 An arbitrator is also in a better
position to give the evidence the weight it deserves, unlike a jury, which may, in
fact, become confused by such evidence and without specialized knowledge be ren-
dered unable to fairly weigh or balance the same.103 Overall, the advantages of
arbitration for a nursing home resident and their family is that the process is usually
quicker,104 less expensive,105 involves less emotional strain,106 and is typically more
flexible compared to litigation.107 Despite the many advantages of arbitration pro-
visions for both parties, the disadvantages outweigh the benefits.
B. The Disadvantages of Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Nurs-
ing Home Contracts
Arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts also offer specific disad-
vantages compared to traditional litigation. The disadvantages of arbitration for the
nursing home resident include: no right to a trial by a jury;108 lack of publicity;109
decision making by a potentially biased arbitrator;110 inability to create precedent;111
a lack of alternatives to, or appeals from, the arbitrator’s decision;112 decreased ev-
identiary requirement;113 and often decreased compensation compared to litiga-
tion.114
95. Id.
96. Brinson, supra note 84.
97. Repa, supra note 93.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. (èUnlike trials, which must be worked into overcrowded court calendars, arbitration hear-




103. William Turner, A Brief Overview of the Use of Evidence in Arbitration, NEV. LAWYER (Oct.
2010), https://www.nvbar.org/nvlawmag-archive-957232/Oct_2010_Evidence_Arbitration.pdf.
104. Sacopulos & Segal, supra note 13.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Brinson, supra note 84.
108. Lauren Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers Undermine
Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9-2 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 329 (2015).
109. Andrews, supra note 86.
110. Senate Rep. No. 110-518 (2008).
111. Andrews, supra note 86.
112. Senate Rep. No. 110-518 (2008).
113. Id.
114. Andrews, supra note 86.
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The first disadvantage of requiring arbitration, rather than permitting litigation,
is the removal of the right to a trial by a jury. The Seventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by jury where the value in
controversy exceeds twenty dollars.115 Arbitration provisions take away the resi-
dent’s right to a trial by jury given in the Seventh Amendment.116 By placing the
resident and their family in a take-it-or-leave-it situation, mandatory arbitration pro-
visions effectively strip nursing home residents of the right to be heard by a jury in
a situation where few alternatives to signing the provision exist.117
The second issue with arbitration is the lack of publicity for both the proceed-
ings and the results. With arbitration proceedings, there is no judge, jury, or public
audience to hear the resident’s case.118 The proceedings are conducted in private,
and the results and materials are also often protected by confidentiality rules.119 The
federal government also permits the results of arbitration to go unreported.120
The third issue with arbitration is the possibility that a biased arbitrator will be
making the decision. The final rule set in 2019 mandates a neutral arbitrator be-
tween the nursing home and the resident.121 While the arbitrator is technically
agreed upon by both parties, the nursing home is in a much better position to select
an arbitrator based on previous arbitrations and the repeat-player effect.122 While
the arbitrator may appear neutral, the individual may be ultimately chosen by the
nursing facility and may be inclined to favor a provider to ensure future business,123
and the arbitration decision is likely to not appealable.124
The fourth issue is the inability to set precedent for future claims through arbi-
tration. Nursing homes are unlikely to change because arbitrations do not set bind-
ing precedent for future arbitrations, unlike the way courts operate.125 In addition
to a lack of precedent being set, arbitration does not require an admission of fault
by the nursing home.126 This may be detrimental to both parties as it decreases the
recovery for the plaintiff, but it also does not completely clear the nursing home’s
name when there may have been no negligence at all.127 Arbitrators tend to award
a more modest award than sympathetic juries based on their specialized expertise
and experience, but plaintiffs are more likely to receive some monetary award in
115. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
116. Id.
117. Lauren Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers Undermine
Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9-2 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 329 (2015).
118. Andrews, supra note 110.
119. Id.
120. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a )Privatization of the Justice Sys-
tem’, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/busi-
ness/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html.
121. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revision of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities: Ar-
bitration Agreements, 84 FR 34718 (Jul. 18, 2019).`
122. Id.
123. Forced Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term Care Facility Admission Contracts, THE
CONSUMERVOICE (2021), https://theconsumervoice.org/issues/issue_details/arbitration.
124. Id.
125. Gregory Brown, How Arbitration Clauses Effect Nursing Home Abuse Cases, BROWN &
CHARBONNEAU LLP: LEGAL BLOGS (2016), https://www.bc-llp.com/arbitration-clauses-affect-nursing-
home-abuse-cases/.
126. See Sohn & Bal, supra note 87, at 1372.
127. Id.
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arbitration where there was no negligence by the nursing home.128 Traditional ad-
judication will require a finding of fault by one party whereas arbitration does not.
The fifth issue is the ways in which a court may overturn an arbitration award
differ considerably from the ways an appellate court may overturn a trial court’s
decision.129 The grounds for overturning an arbitration award include: if the award
was procured by fraud,130 if there was evident corruption or partiality among the
arbitrators,131 if the arbitrators acted in a way that prejudiced the rights of any
party,132 or if the arbitrators exceeded their powers or èimperfectly executed themæ
so a final award was not made.133 An error in the application of law is not included
in the FAA as a grounds for vacating an award from arbitration.134 If the decision
is binding, it can only be appealed on narrow grounds:135 neglect,136 procedural
bias,137 error,138 or fraud.139 This issue makes overturning an arbitration decision
much more difficult than appealing traditional adjudication.
The sixth issue with arbitration is the informal evidentiary process. The re-
quirements for discovery in an arbitration are usually set by the arbitrator140 and are
often far more relaxed than the rules of evidence and procedure used by courts.141
The lack of discovery will favor defendants because the information needed for
plaintiffs is commonly in the defendant’s possession.142 Evidence permitted or
excluded in arbitration will not be reviewed by the court unless the arbitrator was
found to have committed misconduct by refusing to permit material evidence.143
The seventh issue with arbitration is that it often results in lower awards for the
plaintiff compared to litigation. Arbitration awards have been found to be 35%
lower than if the nursing home residents or their family had pursued their claim
through the courts.144 One of the contributing factors to a lower arbitral award com-
pared to an award for damages in court may be the role of the arbitrator.145 With
the arbitrator making the final decision, they may feel pressured to provide some
128. Id.
129. See generally, American Arbitration Ass’n, Challenges to an Arbitration Award, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/challenges-to-an-ar-





134. Stephen Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 ARBITRATION L. REV. 56
(2014).
135. Id.
136. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018).
137. Sohn & Bal, supra note 87, at 1374.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Nan Aron, Leveling the legal playing field: Limit forced arbitration, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-aron-arbitration-contracts-instagram-20140114-
story.html.
141. William Turner, A Brief Overview of the Use of Evidence in Arbitration, NEVADA LAWYER (Oct.
2010), https://www.nvbar.org/nvlawmag-archive-957232/Oct_2010_Evidence_Arbitration.pdf.
142. Ann E. Krasuski, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts
with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTHCARE L. 263, 299 (2004).
143. Ware, supra note 135, at 70.
144. William Smith III & Robert Schenk, A Brief History of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Nursing
Homes and the Current State of Law, THE CONSUMER VOICE (2018), https://theconsumervoice.org/up-
loads/files/general/Arbitration_Clauses_in_Nursing_Home_Admission_Contracts.pdf.
145. Sohn & Bal, supra note 87, at 1376.
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sort of compromise on behalf of both parties.146 Arbitrators are also more special-
ized and experienced in their role than juries who may be swayed and sympathetic
to victims of nursing homes.147
Regardless of the amount that the arbitrator awards, these awards are extremely
difficult to appeal as compared to results in litigation.148 The parties will usually
decide if the decision will be binding or nonbinding/advisory.149 Arbitration provi-
sions are a part of the nursing home contract and claims against the provisions may
be brought by the victim for the contract itself.
IV. CONTRACTDEFENSES TOMANDATORYARBITRATION PROVISIONS
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions are often a portion of a nursing
home admission contract.150 By raising contract defenses, a nursing home resident
can bring a claim that the nursing home contract itself was invalid based on some
common contract defenses. Contract defenses are one of the main defenses to man-
datory arbitration provisions found in nursing home admission contracts.151 The
elements of a contract are: è(1) two or more contracting parties, (2) consideration,
(3) an agreement that is sufficiently definite, (4) parties with legal capacity to make
a contract, (5) mutual assent, and (6) no legal prohibition precluding contract for-
mation.æ152 While mandatory arbitration provisions have been found to be enforce-
able per the FAA,153 the provisions in nursing home admission contracts have often
raised questions as to their enforceability due to the lack of capacity of the nursing
home residents and their families at the time they enter the contract.154 Furthermore,
the authority the nursing home possesses over the resident at the time they enter the
contract raises a question as to whether the èmutual assentæ element of a contract
has been met.155
The lack of capacity by nursing home residents and their families derives from
a lack of information about the arbitration process and the necessity of admission
to the nursing facility. In order to assent to a contract, both parties must first have
the capacity to enter into a contract.156 èThe test of legal capacity to contract is the
ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of the particular transac-
tion.æ157
In Landers v. Integrated Health Services of Shreveport, the nursing home resi-
dent signed a contract with an arbitration provision, but the court ruled that Landers
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See generally Arbitration, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dis-
pute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProcesses/arbitration/.
149. Id.
150. Krasuki, supra note 143, at 268.
151. Id. at 273.
152. Adams Cmty. Care Ctr., LLC v. Reed, 37 So. 3d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 2010) (quoting Grenada Living
Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 961 So. 2d 33, 36–37 (Miss. 2007)).
153. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 (2018).
154. Krasuki, supra note 143, at 276.
155. Jessica Fargen, Nursing home residents often sign away rights to sue, BOSTON HERALD (Mar. 8,
2010), https://www.bostonherald.com/2010/03/08/nursing-home-residents-often-sign-away-rights-to-
sue/.
156. Conners v. Eble, 269 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky. 1954).
157. Id. at 718.
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lacked capacity due to her forgetfulness, depression, and schizophrenia.158 The
court found the nursing home was aware that Landers lacked capacity and had a
duty to conduct a neuro/cognitive assessment.159 The court held that there was no
evidence to show that Landers understood the implication of the arbitration agree-
ment.160
Similar to Landers, in Liberty Health & Rehab of Indianola, L.L.C. v. Howarth,
the court held that the decedent lacked mental capacity to assent to the agreement
because of a lack of capacity to èmake coherent decisions regarding important mat-
ters.æ161 There was also no evidence that the nursing home’s employees assisted
the decedent with the meaning of the agreement.162 While Liberty Health & Rehab
of Indianola was focused on mental capacity rather than the capacity to understand
by a layperson in a high stakes situation, both Landers and Liberty Health & Rehab
of Indianola required an understanding on the part of the resident as to the terms of
the agreement through an explanation of their rights from the nursing home.163 The
court noted that the arbitration provisions are also placed in a complex admission
package given to families during an emotional and overwhelming time of change,
resulting in information being easily misunderstood when not explained to the par-
ties to the contract.164
The authority that the nursing facility possesses in relation to the nursing home
residents and their families may result in the families mistakenly believing that they
do not have a choice other than to sign the contract.165 èThe usual term to describe
the unenforceable adhesion contract is äunconscionable.’æ166 A contract must be
both substantively and procedurally conscionable.167 To determine if a contract is
procedurally unconscionable, a court will look at the circumstances of how the con-
tract came about, including equality of bargaining strength, situation of either party,
and feeling of ability to accept or decline the demanded terms.168
In Hayes v. The Oakridge Home, the court held that the arbitration provision
could not be procedurally unconscionable solely based on the resident’s age.169 In
addition to Hayes, in Prieto v. Healthcare & Retirement Corporation of America,
the arbitration agreement was held to be procedurally unconscionable based on the
fact that the resident’s daughter was asked to sign a packet of documents, which
included the arbitration agreement, while the resident was on his way to the nursing
home, without the terms being explained to her.170 Similarly, in Wascovich v.
Presonacare of Ohio, Inc., the resident was transferred from the hospital to the nurs-
ing home, did not have anyone accompanying her, and did not have any legal
158. Landers v. Integrated Health Servs. of Shreveport, 903 So. 2d 609, 612 (La. 2005).
159. Id. at 4.
160. Id. at 4.
161. Liberty Health &Rehab of Indianola, LLC v. Howarth, 11 F. Supp. 3d 684, 687 (N.D.Miss. 2014).
162. Id. at 688.
163. Landers v. Integrated Health Servs. of Shreveport, 903 So. 2d at 612; Liberty Health & Rehab of
Indianola, LLC v. Howarth, 11 F. Supp. at 684.
164. Fargen, supra note 156.
165. Id.
166. Michael Sacppulos & Jeffrey Segal, Limiting Exposure to Medical Malpractice Claims and De-
famatory Cyber Postings via Patient Contracts, 467(2) CLIN. ORTHOP. RELAT. RES. 427, 429 (2008),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2628519/.
167. See Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 304 P.3d 409, 418 (N.M. 2013).
168. Id.
169. Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Ohio 2009).
170. Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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expertise.171 The court held that these circumstances constituted procedural uncon-
scionability with the resident’s cognitive abilities only being weighed minimally
due to the lack of evidence produced as to her cognitive impairment.172
Procedural unconscionability is determined based on a variety of factors that
ultimately determine the bargaining power or lack thereof.173 To determine the bar-
gaining power of a party to a contract, the court may look at the party’s age, educa-
tion, intelligence, experience with similar transactions, who was the drafter to the
contract, and if the terms of the contract were explained to the party with less bar-
gaining power.174
While many nursing home residents may suffer from cognitive impairment
which would result in procedural unconscionability underWascovich, there are also
many instances when residents are rushed into a facility, their family is handed a
stack of forms to fill out, and the family has little to no alternatives to signing all of
the paperwork without an informed understanding of the forms as was the case in
Prieto. Based on the previous cases, these circumstances should render the nursing
home contract procedurally unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. With
both the current pandemic that is ravaging nursing homes and the immunity shields
that were put in place by the Trump Administration, contract defenses may be im-
portant to permit residents to have their day in court despite the mandatory arbitra-
tion provision.
V. CONCLUSION
Mandatory arbitration provisions are not a recently disputed issue, but the past
two administrations have enacted differing rules regarding these agreements. The
Obama Administration attempted to dissolve the use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements while the Trump Administration reversed the complete prohibition and
instead permitted the provisions so long as the provision being signed by the resi-
dent was not a condition for admission to the facility. COVID-19, the recent elec-
tion, and the United States’ aging population are bringing attention to many of the
regulatory issues in nursing homes with mandatory arbitration provisions being one
of the key reasons many issues have remained hidden as a result of arbitration pro-
visions in nursing home contracts.
Mandatory arbitration provisions admittedly do have some benefits to residents
and their families. This includes lower cost, increased efficiency, less hostility, and
greater flexibility than what is seen through litigation. The benefits are likely out-
weighed by the costs of keeping residents and their families out of court. The costs
of arbitration provisions include the lack of publicity of the decision and case, the
potential for the case to be determined by a biased arbitrator, the inability for a
precedent to be established for future claims, a decrease in the average results
achieved, and the decrease in the evidence required and therefore turned over the
defendant to prove the claim.
If the Biden administration does not make a change to the Trump Administra-
tion’s 2017 rules, nursing home residents may continue to face arbitration
171. Wascovich v. Personacare of Ohio, 943 N.E.2d 1030, 1037 (Ohio 2010).
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provisions in their nursing home contracts. If one is faced with an arbitration pro-
vision, a possible defense to the provision is rooted in contract law. It may be in a
plaintiff’s interest to argue that the resident or their family lacked the capacity at
the time of the contract formation to enter into a valid contract and therefore it is
unenforceable. It may also be beneficial to argue that the circumstances surround-
ing the contract formation render the contract procedurally unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable.
In the Biden Administration’s first few weeks in office, they have not addressed
nursing home regulation or the liability of nursing homes.175 This may be surprising
when considering the changes the Trump Administration made as a result of
COVID-19,176 the high number of executive orders signed by President Biden in his
first 30 days,177 and the current vaccination rate of nursing home staff and resi-
dents.178 It can be predicted that the Biden Administration will likely address the
Trump Administration’s changes as more nursing home residents, nursing home
staff, and United States citizens are vaccinated and able to safely reenter nursing
homes.
175. SeeMeredith Deliso, All of Biden’s executive orders, and other notable actions, so far, ABCNEWS
(Feb. 11, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/bidens-executive-orders-notable-ac-
tions/story?id=75500311.
176. Sklar & Terry, supra note 68.
177. Tamara Keith, With 28 Executive Orders Signed, President Biden is Off to a Record Start, NP
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/03/963380189/with-28-executive-orders-signed-president-
biden-is-off-to-a-record-start.
178. Matthew Conlen, Sarah Mervosh & Danielle Ivory, Nursing Homes, Once Hotspots, Far Outpace
U.S. in Covid Declines, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2021/02/25/us/nursing-home-covid-vaccine.html.
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